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ABSTRACT
Many billions of tax payer dollars have been 
spent on aerospace programs. In order to con­ 
tinue further expenditures for the exploration of 
space, the American people demand a payoff which 
is beneficial to the average citizen. This paper 
will outline one such "spin-off"; VIZ, the appli­ 
cation of reliability and system safety analyt­ 
ical techniques to a civic need.
INTRODUCTION
In 1969, there were over 55,000 people killed on 
the nation's highways and another 2,000,000 seri­ 
ously injured. The cost of these accidents esti­ 
mated by the National Safety Council exceeds 11.3 
billion dollars.
The number of railroad train derailments has in­ 
creased over 100 percent in the last five years. 
There were 5,487 in 1968 alone, and the rate is 
going up.
There were 1,500 fatalities at railroad crossings 
in 1968.
In 1969, there were 27 occasions where railroad 
accidents required the evacuation of populated 
areas due to the hazardous cargo involved. 
Twenty-five of the accidents were considered to 
be major and resulted in explosion, fire, or 
lethal contamination of the surrounding area.
The shipment of hazardous cargo (poisons - pesti­ 
cides - explosives - flammables, etc.) by rail, 
truck, and air is regulated by a tariff written 
and controlled by a non-government agency.
With these, and other facts identified, the need 
for the application of aerospace techniques to 
the solution of the problems became obvious.
Hopefully this paper will generate an interest by 
the civic community for the application of proven 
techniques to the resolution of civic problems 
which exist today. The discussion of the techni­ 
que is descriptive rather than specific for rea- ' 
sons of brevity. However, there are many who are 
familiar with the techniques and agree the ap­ 
proach has merit.
THEORY OF APPLICATION
For many years the aerospace industry has used 
scientific analytical techniques for assuring 
system safety and reliability. Typical of these 
techniques are:
Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Operations Safety Analysis 
Human Error Prediction 
Logic Diagram Analysis
These techniques were widely used to assure the 
safety and reliability of systems such as Minute- 
man and Saturn/Apollo. The importance of positive 
system assurance within these programs is obvious. 
In the case of Minuteman, failure could be catas­ 
trophic and in the case of Saturn/Apollo, loss of 
the astronaut crew, not to mention the tremendous 
loss in terms of dollars and national prestige.
The development and application of such analyses 
did not occur overnight. It was a long and some­ 
time painful road for the developers and advocates 
of the techniques. Like many new developments, 
the advocates are frequently considered to be 
"cultists" for which the program is better off 
without, or at best, are only to be tolerated.
As the techniques were improved and their value to 
the program demonstrated, the discipline of relia­ 
bility and system safety engineering was gradually 
accepted and is now a mandatory requirement in all 
major DOD- and NASA- sponsored programs.
The logic diagram, sometimes called fault tree, is 
a deductive analytical technique which lends it­ 
self to detailed system analysis, decision-logic, 
and communication. It results in a graphic and 
logical representation of the various combinations 
of possible events, occurring within a system, 
which can cause a predefined undesired event.
An undesired event is any event which is identi­ 
fied as objectionable or unwanted, such as a po­ 
tential accident, hazardous condition, or undesired 
rate increase. (Correlated to the civic applica­ 
tion, the undesired event might be fatality at a 
railroad crossing, insufficient controls for ship­ 
ment of hazardous cargo, or increased accident 
rate.)
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During the development phase of a major program 
such as Minuteman, emphasis is devoted to the 
assurance that undesirable events will not occur 
to the operational system. To provide this as­ 
surance each theoretical undesired event is as­ 
sumed. The logic tree is then developed to de­ 
termine what event or series of events could 
cause the undesirable event. For example, if the 
assumed undesired event was accidental rocket en­ 
gine ignition, the causative event could be in­ 
advertent closure of relay contacts.
In applying the logic diagram technique to a 
civic problem, a major change to the aerospace 
technique is necessary. Whereas, in the above 
example, we assume certain undesirable events and 
then determine what can cause them, in the civic 
application the undesirable condition now exists 
and we determine the cause. A subtle, but im­ 
portant difference.
Figure 1 is a modified version of the logic dia­ 
gram of a specific problem of the civilian com­ 
munity. This condition is selected because it 
allows for a mental exercise of the logic diagram 
application. Those who are familiar with the 
technique will notice two major departures from 
the accepted practice of constructing the dia­ 
grams :
1. The absence of 
OR gates.
AND gates -
2. The top undesired event is an existing condi­ 
tion and the segments are results of the con­ 
dition. Whereas, classically, the top event 
would be the undesired event and the segments 
the causative events.
DEVELOPING THE LOGIC DIAGRAM
Figure 1 diagrams the results of INSUFFICIENT 
URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION. The diagram depicts 
two prime branches.
1. INCREASED USE OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES
2. GHETTO GROWTH
The populace which must work in the metropolitan 
area are faced with two choices: either move in­ 
to the city or drive to and from employment from 
an urban area. Moving into the city is not nec­ 
essarily considered an undesirable result of 
insufficient urban mass transportation; however, 
it does contribute to the growth of ghetto areas 
when there is an ethnic attraction. The use of 
internal combustion engines is undesirable be­ 
cause of the pollution increase.
Following; the ghetto growth branch of the diagram 
we identify many undesirable results such as 
CRIME INCREASE, WELFARE DEMAND INCREASE, EDUCA­ 
TIONAL FACILITY DEMANDS, AND ESTHETIC POLLUTION 
INCREASE. Each of these undesirable conditions 
resulting from ghetto growth would be diagrammed 
in detail. Other undesirable results would be
identified and diagrammed in detail; e. g., riot 
and demonstration potential. For purposes of 
this paper, the diagram has been simplified to 
demonstrate the application of the technique.
Following the diagram through the ESTHETIC POLLU­ 
TION INCREASE branch, we can identify the IN­ 
CREASED USE OF OLD AUTOMOBILES which in turn 
leads to the INABILITY TO MAINTAIN SAFETY STAND­ 
ARDS and/or STEALS TO MAINTAIN SAFETY STANDARDS. 
These undesired conditions lead directly to IN­ 
CREASED ACCIDENT RATE, FAMILY ADDED TO WELFARE 
ROLES and INCREASED CRIME RATE. Similar logic is 
used in defining the branch under INCREASED USE 
OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES.
After the diagram has been completed, a valid 
assessment of INSUFFICIENT URBAN MASS TRANSPOR­ 
TATION can be made. Qualitative assessment of 
this particular logic diagram, as simple as it is, 
shows graphically that INSUFFICIENT URBAN MASS 
TRANSPORTATION causes or contributes to:
Ghetto Growth
Increased Pollution
Increased Crime
Increased Accident
Degradation of Metropolitan Area
Increased Welfare Requirements
These conditions require expenditure of tax 
dollars. The expenditure becomes an ever in­ 
creasing tax burden which might more profitably 
be expended in the reduction or elimination of 
the cause rather than reacting to the results of 
the condition.
Many of the undesired results, due to INSUFFI­ 
CIENT URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION, should be ana­ 
lyzed by separate logic diagrams. For example: 
INCREASED ACCIDENT RATE which shows up in both 
branches of the logic tree would be treated as a 
separate diagram. For purposes of depicting the 
scope of the analytical technique, one result of 
increased accident rate is aggravation of serious 
injury following accident (Figure 2). This 
event and each of the causes which aggravate the 
injury, is identified and possible solutions of 
the cause proposed. This logic technique per­ 
formed by experienced analysts portrays the com­ 
plete picture and allows responsible officials 
to initiate corrective measures. Frequently the 
determination of increasing the urban transpor­ 
tation media is based on the financial success of 
the media amortized by the fares received over a 
period of time. However, if the true costs of 
insufficient transportation is assessed consi­ 
dering the costs of pollution, crime, accidents, 
welfare, etc., it might very well be more cost 
effective to the community to subsidize the media.
The previous discussion concerned an extremely 
broad and complex problem which exists in many 
metropolitan areas. The condition was selected 
so that the potential of the logic diagram ana­ 
lysis could be demonstrated.
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CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS CARGO TRANSPORTATION ILLUSTRATIONS
A more specific application is shown in Figure 3. 
This problem, INADEQUATE CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS 
CARG9 TRANSPORTATION, is "real world" and should 
receive priority attention throughout the country. 
In 1969, there were 25 major railroad accidents 
involving hazardous materials. Major in this in­ 
stance includes: fire, explosion, contamination, 
and evacuation of populace. Each occurred in 
sparsly populated areas. Figure 4 describes three 
which are typical. There were hundreds of cases 
where hazardous cargo, such as Class B poisons, 
leaked during truck or rail transport. Thousands 
of cases are suspected.
The logic tree (Figure 3) is constructed as pre­ 
viously described. The existing undesirable 
condition is shown as the top segment of the tree. 
(In this instance, the diagram analyzes only 
poisons (pesticides, etc.)). The subsequent 
branches of the tree are results of the top un­ 
desirable condition. For the sake of brevity, 
the logic involved in the preparation of the tree 
will not be discussed. Suffice to say that each 
branch and segment of the tree represents a con­ 
dition which did occur during 1969 and was the 
result of inadequate controls. Each of the seg­ 
ments of this tree would be represented in a sep­ 
arate diagram to describe the specific event. 
For example: CONTAINER NOT ADEQUATE FOR CONTENT 
is a prime candidate based on the number of leaks 
discovered in 1969.
After the problems associated with INADEQUATE 
CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS CARGO TRANSPORTATION are 
defined in the logic diagram, there is a need to 
develop preventive measures. The use of the Pre­ 
liminary Hazard Analysis technique provides a 
method for satisfying that need. (Figure 5).
Figure 5 is a Preliminary Hazard Analysis which 
the analyst develops based on the information he 
derives from the logic diagram. This analysis de­ 
scribes the hazardous condition in brief terms 
and provides the accident prevention measures 
necessary for its control. As a result of this 
analysis, new or more stringent standards, dif­ 
ferent inspection methods, additional training, 
etc., are developed and implemented.
A third application of the logic diagram techni­ 
que is shown in Figure 6, LACK OF A BALANCED 
AND INTEGRATED SAFETY PLAN. Unless the state 
generates an integrated safety plan which de­ 
fines in detail the role of all agencies re­ 
sponsible for safety, the results will be as 
shown on the diagram. The capability to effi­ 
ciently react to a catastrophic condition does 
not exist nor is preventive safety given the em­ 
phasis it deserves. The tax dollar expended for 
safety is generally wasted for the results 
achieved. When results of the undesired event 
are diagramed in this fashion, a rational 
prioritization of effort and funds can be made 
to optimize the safety of the community.
Figure 1. Insufficient Urban Mass Transportation 
Figure 2. Aggravation of Serioud Injury Follow­ 
ing Accident 
Figure 3. Inadequate Control of Hazardous Cargo
Transportation
Figure 4. Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials 
Figure 5. Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Figure 6. Lack of Balanced & Integrated Safety 
Plan
13-3
Figure 1
•Mt
ttfil
I
LAW
AftfMVALOF 
MEDICAL AID
|
"II& i —— 1 —— I! ——— ' —— |
CONGESTED LAC* Of 
TRAFFIC COMMUNICATION
SOLUTION COMBRDCfiATlOMB
• USE Of HEUCOPTli AMBULANCE
* PROVIDE DIRECTIONAL TRAFFIC INDICATORS
TO DIRECT TRAFFIC TO SINGLE LANE -
TRAFFIC INDICATORS CONTROLLEO FROM
CENTRAL STATION
* PROVIDE EMERGENCY TRAFFIC LANE IN 
FUTURE MAW ARTERIAL HIGHWAYS. THIS 
LANE NOT TO BE USED FOR REGULAR
TRAFFIC.
* PROVIDE EMERGENCY VEHICLES AT 
LOCATIONS THAT NAVE A HISTORY OF MOM 
ACCIDENT RATES DURING PREDICTABLE
HOURS OF OCCURRENCE
* PROVIDE EMERGENCY TELEPHONES ON
MGHWAYS WHERE COMMUNICATIONS FOR
HELP WOULD BE DIFFICULT
1
MUDCOUAT1 
THAIMIM8
1KNJ
1
MIARJMLrrvm
IXTMCATl
NONAVAILABILITY 
OF PftCFCft TOOLS
l/TONCOMBBMEftATOBBS
1
RftlOft 
RTRUCTVNU4. 
DAMAOC
• PROVIDE THAWING OF AMBULANCE A
RESCU
TECIM
f PI
uou RSONNELINES
EGRESS/INGRES1
* ESTABLJSH STATE CONTROLLED RESCUE
* EMERGENCY SAFETY SCHOOLS
• PROVIOE AMBULANCE A RESCUE VEHICLES 
WITH MODERN INGRESS RESCUE EQUIPMENT 
- SIMILAR TO NEW YORK FORT AUTHORITY
* UTILIZE EXPERIENCE OF NONFLAMMABLE 
MATERIAL RESEARCH SUCH AS THAT 
DEVELOPED IN THE APOLLO PROGRAM
* WORK WITH NHSS TO MAKE STANDARD
FOR FUTURE AUTO MANUFACTURE
* WORK WITH NHSS TO REQUIRE
RUPTURE PROOF GAS TANKS A SELF
EXTINGUBHING FIRE SYSTEMS ON
FUTURE AUTO MANUFACTURE
1
TIM
on
TIM
1
tve
IKK
MAI
ROt
MMt
M
1
HAND CAMAY 
KftTUfWJATON
sotimoNa9MB
• TRAINING OF EMERGI
(AMBU
SUM LA
ANCE-P
ITOARBH
merRA
1
VEHICLE OH 
HANDCARflY 
NOTPOSSJBLE
DCftATK9m
9ICYCNEW
OAT SOU
NOERS
01*
• USE OF HELICOPTER
RESCUE EQUIPMENT
INCLUDED w
1
1
DELAY Ml
GCT 
MKO
CONGESTED 
TRAFFIC
004junoNO
TV* 
KAJ
1
OKI
ITO
LAK>
1
RCBCUCVEHCLf
BREAKDOWN 
OftAGdDtRfT
KttRATM
• SAME MUniON CONSIDERATION!
ARRIVAL
• ASSURE 1
OF ME (Ml
lESCUEVf
KNOT NEGLECTED
AL>
WCJ
uo
LEMAINTG
3MB
(ABLATE
NANCE
• PROVIDE STRINGENT DRIVERS TEST FOR
EMERGENCY VEHICLE DRIVERS 
• PROVIDE SPECIAL HIGH SPEED DEFERBJVE
DRIVING COURSE
• OESNIN VEHICLE FOR MAXIMUM ENERGY 
ABSORPTION DURING IMPACT
• ENSURE RESTRAINTS FOR CARGO SUCH AS
UTTERS. RESCUE TOOLS, ETC. TO PREVENT 
MOVEMENT DURING IMPACT
• PROVIDE INFLATABLE BAG CONCEPT FOR
ATTENDANTS ANO THE INJURED
Figure 2
9-e
i
-s OJ
ACCIDENTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
EVENT
CAUSE
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
RESULT
EVENT
CAUSE
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
RESULT
EVENT
CAUSE
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
RESULT
TRAIN DERAILMENT - LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI, JANUARY 25, 1969 
WHEEL BROKE 
PROPANE GAS 
14 CARS DERAILED 
2 FATALITIES 
33 HOSPITALIZED 
60 HOMES DESTROYED 
EVACUATION OF 1000 POPULACE 
BURNING MATERIEL/FRAGMENTS SCATTERED 1/2 MILE RADIUS
RAILROAD CAR EXPLOSION - WELLS, NEVADA, JULY, 1969 
HOT BOX - FIRE - MOVING TRAIN 
750 LB BOMBS - REMOTE LOCATION 
4 CRATERS 20' WIDE X 50' LONG 
FRAGMENTATION UP TO 1/2 MILE
RAILROAD TRAIN DERAILMENT 6 COLLISION -DUNRIETH,
INDIANA, JANUARY 1968
BROKEN RAIL WHICH WAS FORGED IN 1929
CYANIDE
TOWN OF 250 EVACUATED FOR 2 DAYS
COLLISION WITH FREIGHT TRAIN OF 106 CARS
APPROXIMATELY 200 BUSINESSES & HOMES DESTROYED/DAMAGED
CYANIDE POLLUTION OF LOCAL WATER - SEVERAL MONTHS
Figure 4
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